Model checking of strategic ability under imperfect information is known to be hard. The complexity results range from NP-completeness to undecidability, depending on the precise setup of the problem. No less importantly, fixpoint equivalences do not generally hold for imperfect information strategies, which seriously hampers incremental synthesis of winning strategies.
INTRODUCTION
There is a growing number of works that study the syntactic and semantic variants of the strategic logic ATL for agents with imperfect information [2] . The contributions are mainly theoretical, and include results concerning the conceptual soundness of a given semantics [29, 18, 1, 21, 10, 15, 2] , meta-logical properties [16, 7] , and the complexity of model checking [29, 20, 16, 30, 13, 5] . However, there is relatively little research on the use of the logics, in particular on practical algorithms for reasoning and/or verification in scenarios where agents have a limited view of the world. This is somewhat easy to understand, since model checking of ATL variants with imperfect information has been proved ∆ P 2 -to PSPACE-complete for agents playing memoryless strategies [29, 20, 5] and EXPTIME-complete to undecidable for agents with perfect recall of the past [13, 16] . Moreover, the imperfect information semantics of ATL does not admit alternation-free fixpoint characterizations [6, 11, 12] , which makes incremental synthesis of strategies impossible, or at least difficult to achieve. Some early attempts at verification of imperfect information strategies made their way into the MCMAS model-checker [25, 28, 23, 24] , but the issue was never at the heart of the tool. More dedicated attempts began to emerge only recently [26, 8, 17, 9] . Up until now, experimental results confirm that the initial intuition was right: model checking of strategic modalities for imperfect information is hard, and dealing with it requires innovative algorithms and verification techniques.
In this paper, we propose that in some instances, instead of the exact model checking, it suffices to provide an upper and/or lower bound for the output. The intuition for the upper bound is straightforward: instead of checking existence of an imperfect information strategy, we can look for a perfect information strategy that obtains the same goal. If the latter is false, the former must be false too. Finding a reasonable lower bound is nontrivial, but we construct one by means of a fixpoint expression in alternating epistemic mu-calculus. We begin by showing that the straightforward fixpoint approach does not work. Then, we propose how it can be modified to obtain guaranteed lower bounds. To this end, we alter the next-step operator in such a way that traversing the appropriate epistemic neighborhood is seen as an atomic activity. We show the correctness of the translations, establish their computational complexity, and validate the approach by experiments with some scalable scenarios.
VERIFYING STRATEGIC ABILITY
In this section we provide an overview of the relevant variants of ATL. We refer the to [3, 31, 29, 6, 19] for details.
Models, Strategies, Outcomes
A concurrent epistemic game structure or CEGS is given by M = Agt, St, Props, V, Act, d, o, {∼a| a ∈ Agt} which includes a nonempty finite set of all agents Agt = {1, . . . , k}, a nonempty set of states St, a set of atomic propositions Props and their valuation V : Props → 2
St , and a nonempty finite set of (atomic) actions Act. Function d : Agt × St → 2
Act defines nonempty sets of actions available to agents at each state, and o is a (deterministic) transition function that assigns the outcome state q = o(q, α1, . . . , α k ) to state q and a tuple of actions α1, . . . , α k that can be executed by Agt in q. We write da(q) instead of d(a, q). Every ∼a⊆ St×St is an epistemic equivalence relation. The CEGS is assumed to be uniform, in the sense that q ∼a q implies da(q) = da(q ). Upon exit from the polling station, the voter can hand in a proof of how she voted to the coercer (action give) or refuse to hand in the proof (action ng). The proof may be a certified receipt from the election authorities, a picture of the ballot taken with a smartphone, etc. After that, the coercer can either punish the voter (pun) or not punish (np).
The CEGS Mvote modeling the scenario for n = 2 is shown in Figure 1 . Proposition vote i labels states where the voter has already voted for candidate i. Proposition pun indicates states where v has been punished. The indistinguishability relation for the coercer is depicted by dotted lines.
A strategy of agent a ∈ Agt is a conditional plan that specifies what a is going to do in every possible situation. Formally, a perfect information memoryless strategy for a can be represented by a function sa : St → Act satisfying sa(q) ∈ da(q) for each q ∈ St. An imperfect information memoryless strategy additionally satisfies that sa(q) = sa(q ) whenever q ∼a q . Following [29] , we refer to the former as Ir-strategies, and to the latter as ir-strategies.
A collective x-strategy sA, for A ⊆ Agt and x ∈ {Ir, ir}, is a tuple of individual x-strategies, one per agent from A.
The set of all such strategies is denoted by Σ x A . By sA|a we denote the strategy of agent a ∈ A selected from sA.
Given two partial functions f, f : X Y , we say that f extends
Act is called a partial x-strategy for a if s a is extended by some strategy sa ∈ Σ x a . A collective partial x-strategy sA is a tuple of partial x-strategies, one per agent from A.
A path λ = q0q1q2 . . . is an infinite sequence of states such that there is a transition between each qi, qi+1. We use λ[i] to denote the ith position on path λ (starting from i = 0). Function out(q, sA) returns the set of all paths that can result from the execution of strategy sA from state q. We will sometimes write out Ir (q, sA) instead of out(q, sA). Moreover, function out ir (q, sA) = a∈A q∼aq out(q , sA) collects all the outcome paths that start from states that are indistinguishable from q to at least one agent in A.
Alternating-Time Temporal Logic
We use a variant of ATL that explicitly distinguishes between perfect and imperfect information abilities. Formally, the syntax is defined by the following grammar:
where x ∈ {Ir, ir}, p ∈ Props and A ⊆ Agt. We read A ir γ as "A can identify and execute a strategy that enforces γ," X as "in the next state," G as "now and always in the future," and U as "until." A Ir γ can be read as "A might be able to bring about γ if allowed to make lucky guesses along the way." We focus on the kind of ability expressed by A ir . The other strategic modality (i.e., A Ir ) will prove useful when approximating A ir .
The semantics of ATL can be defined as follows:
We will often write A ϕ instead of A ir Xϕ to express onestep abilities under imperfect information. Additionally, we define "now or sometime in the future" as Fϕ ≡ U ϕ.
Example 2. Consider model Mvote from Example 1. The following formula expresses that the coercer can ensure that the voter will eventually either have voted for candidate i (presumably chosen by the coercer for the voter to vote for) or be punished: c ir F ¬pun → vote i . We note that it holds in Mvote, q0 for any i = 1, 2. A strategy for c that validates the property is sc(q3) = np, sc(q4) = sc(q5) = sc(q6) = pun for i = 1, and symmetrically for i = 2.
Consequently, the formula v ir G ¬pun ∧ ¬vote i saying that the voter can avoid voting for candidate i and being punished, is false in Mvote, q0 for all i = 1, 2.
We refer to the syntactic fragment containing only A ir modalities as ATLir, and to the one containing only A Ir modalities as ATLIr.
Proposition 1 ([3, 29, 20] ). Model checking ATLIr is P-complete and can be done in time O(|M |·|ϕ|) where |M | is the number of transitions in the model and |ϕ| is the length of the formula.
Model checking ATLir is ∆ P 2 -complete wrt |M | and |ϕ|.
Remark 2. The semantics of A ir γ encodes the notion of "subjective" ability [29, 21] : the agents must have a successful strategy from all the states that they consider possible when the system is in state q. Then, they know that the strategy indeed obtains γ. The alternative notion of "objective" ability [7] requires a winning strategy from state q alone. We focus on the subjective interpretation, as it is more standard in ATL and more relevant in game solving (think of a card game, such as poker or bridge: the challenge is to find a strategy that wins for all possible hands of the opponents).
Note 
Reasoning about Knowledge
Having indistinguishability relations in the models, we can interpret knowledge modalities Ka in the standard way:
• M, q |= Kaϕ iff M, q |= ϕ for all q such that q ∼a q .
The semantics of "everybody knows" (EA) and common knowledge (CA) is defined analogously by assuming the relation ∼ • c ir F (¬Kcvote i ) → pun : The coercer has a strategy so that, eventually, the voter is punished unless the coercer has learnt that the voter voted as instructed;
• c ir G (Kcvote i ) → ¬pun : Moreover, the coercer can guarantee that if he learns that the voter obeyed, then the voter will not be punished.
Alternating Epistemic Mu-Calculus
It is well known that the modalities in ATLIr have simple fixpoint characterizations [3] , and hence ATLIr can be embedded in a variant of µ-calculus with A Ir X as the basic modality. At the same time, the analogous variant of µ-calculus for imperfect information has incomparable expressive power to ATLir [6] , which suggests that, under imperfect information, ATL and fixpoint specifications provide different views of strategic ability.
Formally, alternating epistemic µ-calculus (AEµC) takes the next-time fragment of ATLir, possibly with epistemic modalities, and adds the least fixpoint operator µ. The greatest fixpoint operator ν is defined as dual. Let Vars be a set of second-order variables ranging over 2
St . The language of AEµC is defined by the following grammar:
where p ∈ Props, Z ∈ Vars, a ∈ Agt, A ⊆ Agt, and the formulae are Z-positive, i.e., each free occurrence of Z is in the scope of an even number of negations. We define νZ(ϕ(Z)) ≡ ¬µZ(¬ϕ(¬Z)). A formula of AEµC is alternation-free if in its negation normal form it contains no occurrences of ν (resp. µ) on any syntactic path from an occurrence of µZ (resp. νZ) to a bound occurrence of Z.
The denotational semantics of af -AEµC (i.e., the alternation-free fragment of AEµC) assigns to each formula ϕ the set of states [[ϕ] ] M V where ϕ is true under the valuation V ∈ Vals:
If ϕ contains no free variables, then its validity does not depend on V, and we write
Example 4. Consider the AEµC formula µZ. (¬pun → vote i )∨ c Z , i.e., the "naive" fixpoint translation of the formula c ir F ¬pun → vote i from Example 2. The fixpoint computation produces the whole set of states St. Thus, in particular, Mvote, q0 |= µZ. (¬pun → vote i ) ∨ c Z .
Proposition 3 ([6]).
Model checking af -AEµC with strategic modalities for up to 2 agents is P-complete and can be done in time O(|∼| · |ϕ|) where |∼| is the size of the largest equivalence class among ∼1, . . . , ∼ k , and |ϕ| is the length of the formula.
For coalitions of size at least 3, the problem is between NP and ∆ P 2 wrt |∼| and |ϕ|.
Thus, alternation-free alternating epistemic µ-calculus can be an attractive alternative to ATLir from the complexity point of view. Unfortunately, formulae of ATLir admit no universal translations to af -AEµC. Formally, it was proved in [6, Proposition 6] that af -AEµC does not cover the expressive power of ATLir. The proof uses formulae of type a Fp, but it is easy to construct an analogous argument for a Gp. In consequence, long-term strategic modalities of ATLir do not have alternation-free fixpoint characterizations in terms of the next-step strategic modalities A . A similar result was proved for ATLiR in [11, Theorem 11].
LOWER BOUNDS FOR ABILITIES
The complexity of AEµC model checking seems more attractive than that of ATLir. Unfortunately, the expressivity results cited in Section 2.4 imply that there is no simple fixpoint translation which captures exactly the meaning of ATLir operators. It might be possible, however, to come up with a translation tr that provides a lower bound of the actual strategic abilities, i.e., such that M, q |= tr( A ir γ) implies M, q |= A ir γ. In other words, a translation which can only reduce, but never enhance the abilities of the coalition.
We begin by investigating the "naive" fixpoint translation that mimics the one for ATLIr, and show that it works in some cases, but not in general. Then, we propose how to alter the semantics of the nexttime modality so that a general lower bound can be obtained. We focus first on reachability goals, expressed by formulae A ir Fϕ, and then move on to the other modalities.
Trying It Simple for Reachability Goals
We assume from now on that ϕ is a formula of ATLir, M is a CEGS, and q is a state in M (unless explicitly stated otherwise). We start with the simplest translation, analogous to that of [3] Consider now a slightly stronger fixpoint specification: tr2( A ir Fϕ) = µZ.(EAϕ ∨ A Z). This new translation works to an extent, as the following proposition shows.
M, q |= A ir Fϕ, but the converse does not hold; Proof. Case 1: follows from the fact that for the empty coalition the ir-reachability is equivalent to the IR-reachability, which in turn has a fixpoint characterization. 1 Note that, for A = {a}, EAϕ is equivalent to Kaϕ. 
The proof is by induction on j. We constructively build s 
As ∼a is an equivalence relation, for each
In the first case we put s j+1 a (q) = s j a (q). In the second case, we know that there exists a strategy s
We finally define the partial strategy sa Case 3: Consider the CEGS M1 presented in Figure 3 . We assume that d1(q) = {a, b} and d2(q) = {x, y}, for q ∈ {q1, q2, q3, q4}. In the remaining states the protocols allow only one action. For clarity, we omit from the figure the transitions leaving the states q1, q2, q3, and q4, leading to state sink . Assume now ϕ ≡ p. Note that M, q0 |= µZ.(E {1,2} ϕ∨ {1, 2} Z) and M, q0 |= 1, 2 ir Fϕ. For larger coalitions A, we extend the model with a sufficient number of spurious (idle) agents.
For the other direction, use the counterexample from Case 2, extended with appropriately many spurious agents.
As Propositions 4 and 5 show, translation tr2 provides lower bounds for ATLir verification only in a limited number of instances. Also, the bound is rather loose, as the following example demonstrates.
Example 5. Consider the single-agent CEGS M2 presented in Figure 4A . The sole available strategy, in which agent 1 selects always action a, enforces eventually reaching p, i.e., M2, q0 |= 1 ir Fp. On the other hand, M2, q0 |= µZ. (K1p ∨ 1 Z) . This is because the next-step operator in ATLir requires reaching p simultaneously from all the states indistinguishable from q0, whereas p is reached from q0, q1 in one and two steps, respectively.
Steadfast Next Step Operator
To obtain a tighter lower bound, and one that works universally, we introduce a new modality. A
• can be seen as a semantic variant of the next-step ability operator A where: (i) agents in A look for a short-term strategy that succeeds from the "common knowledge" neighborhood of the initial state (rather than in the "everybody knows" neighborhood), and (ii) they are allowed to "steadfastly" pursue their goal in a variable number of steps within the indistinguishability class. In this section, we propose the semantics of A • and show how to revise the lower bound. Some additional insights are provided in Section 4.
We begin by defining the auxiliary function Reach so that q ∈ ReachM (sA, Q, ϕ) collects all q ∈ Q such that all the paths executing sA from q eventually reach ϕ without leaving Q, except possibly for the last step:
• is defined as follows:
Now we can propose our ultimate attempt at the lower bound for reachability goals: tr3( A ir Fϕ) = µZ.(EAϕ ∨ A
• Z), with the following result. Finally, we build a partial strategy sA = j∈N s j A , whose any extension is s.t. for each q ∈ St, if M, q |= µZ.(EAϕ ∨ A
• Z), then a state in which EAϕ holds is eventually reached along each outcome path λ ∈ out ir (q, s A ). This concludes the proof of the implication.
To see that the converse does not hold, consider model M3 in Figure 4B . We have that M3, q0 |= 1 ir Fp, but M3, q0 |= µZ.(K1p ∨ 1
• Z).
Thus, tr3 indeed provides a universal lower bound for reachability goals expressed in ATLir.
Lower Bounds for "Always" and "Until"
So far, we have concentrated on reachability goals. We now extend the main result to all the modalities of ATLir:
Proof. Case 1: Let us define the sequence {Gj} j∈N of formulae s.t. G0 = CAϕ and Gj+1 = G0∧ A
• Gj, for all j ≥ 0. From Kleene fixed-point theorem, [ 
. It suffices to prove that for each j ∈ N there exists a strategy s
The proof is by induction on j, with the trivial base case. Assume that the inductive assumption holds for some j ∈ N. From the definition of the steadfast next-step operator we can define for each equivalence class
Intuitively, s 
DISCUSSION & PROPERTIES
Theorem 7 shows that tr3(ϕ) provides a correct lower bound of the value of ϕ for all formulae of ATLir. In this section, we discuss the tightness of the approximation from the theoretical point of view. An empirical evaluation will be presented in Section 6.
Comparing tr2 and tr3 for Reachability Goals
Translation tr3 updates tr2 by replacing the standard nextstep ability operator A with the "steadfast next-step ability" A • . The difference between A ϕ and A • ϕ is twofold. First, A ϕ looks for a winning strategy in the "everybody knows" neighborhood of a given state (i.e., [q] ∼ E A ), whereas A
• ϕ looks at the "common knowledge" neighborhood (i.e., [q] ∼ C A ). Secondly, A
• allows to "zig-zag" across [q] ∼ C A until a state satisfying ϕ is found.
Actually, the first change would suffice to provide a universally correct lower bound for ATLir. The second update makes it more useful in models where agents may not see the occurrence of some action, such as M2 of Figure 4A . To see this formally, we show that tr3 provides a strictly tighter approximation than tr2 on singleton coalitions:
The converse does not universally hold.
Proof. It suffices to observe that M, q |= a ϕ implies M, q |= a
• ϕ, for any ϕ ∈ af -AEµC. Note that this is true only for single-agent coalitions. For the converse, notice that in CEGS M2 from Figure 4A we have M2, q0 |= µZ.(K1p ∨ 1
• Z) and M2, q0 |= µZ. (K1p ∨ 1 Z) .
On the other hand, if agent a always sees whenever an action occurs, then tr2 and tr3 coincide for a's abilities. Formally, let us call CEGS M lockstep for a if, whenever there is a transition from q to q in M , we have q ∼a q . The following is straightforward.
When is the Lower Bound Tight?
An interesting question is: what is the subclass of CEGS's for which tr3 is tight, i.e., the answer given by the approximation is exact? We address the question only partially here. In fact, we characterize a subclass of CEGS's for which tr3 is certainly not tight, by the necessary condition below.
Let γ ≡ Gψ or γ ≡ ψ1 U ψ2 for some ψ, ψ1, ψ2 ∈ ATLir. We say that strategy sA ∈ Σ ir A is winning for γ from q if it obtains γ for all paths in out ir (q, sA). Moreover, for such sA, let RR(q, sA, γ) be the relevant reachable states of sA in the context of γ, defined as follows: RR(q, sA, Gψ) is the set of states that occur anywhere in out ir (q, sA); RR(q, sA, ψ1 U ψ2) is the set of states that occur anywhere in out ir (q, sA) before the first occurrence of ψ2.
Proposition 10. Let M be a CEGS, q ∈ StM , and ϕ ≡ A ir γ. Furthermore, suppose that ϕ and tr3(ϕ) are either both true or both false in M, q. Then:
1. either no strategy sA ∈ Σ ir A is winning for γ from q, or 2. there is a strategy sA ∈ Σ ir A which is winning for γ from every q ∈ RR(q, sA, γ).
Conversely, the approximation is not tight if there are winning strategies, but each of them reaches a intermediate state q from which no winning substrategy can be computed. This can only happen if some states in [q ] ∼ E A are not reachable by sA. In consequence, the agents in A forget relevant information that comes alone from the fact that they are executing sA. We will use Proposition 10 in Section 6 to show that the few benchmarks existing in the literature are not amenable to our approximations.
APPROXIMATION SEMANTICS FOR ATLir
Note that M, q |= A ir γ always implies M, q |= EA A Ir γ. Based on this, and the lower bounds established in Theorem 7, we propose the lower approximation tr and the upper approximation TR for ATLir as follows:
The following important results can be proved by straightforward induction on the structure of ϕ. Thus, our approximations potentially offer computational advantage when we consider coalitions whose members have similar knowledge, and especially when verifying abilities of individual agents.
Approximation of abilities under perfect recall. In this paper, we focus on approximating abilities based on memoryless strategies. Approximations might be equally useful for ATLiR (i.e., the variant of ATL using uniform perfect recall strategies); we simply begin with the problem that is easier in its exact form. The high intractability of ATLiR model checking suggests that a substantial extension will be needed to come up with satisfactory approximations.
We also observe that the benchmark in Section 6.2 is a model of perfect recall, i.e., the states explicitly encode the agents' memory of their past observations. In consequence, the memoryless and perfect recall semantics of ATL coincide. The experimental results suggest that, for such models, verification of perfect recall abilities can be much improved by using the approximations proposed here. 
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Theorem 11 and Proposition 12 validate the approximation semantics theoretically. In this section, we back up the theoretical results by looking at how well the approximations work in practice. We address two issues: the performance and the accuracy of the approximations.
Existing Benchmarks
The only publicly available tool that provides verification of ATL with imperfect information is MCMAS [25, 28, 23, 24] . We note, however, that imperfect information strategies are not really at the heart of the model-checker, the focus being on verification of CTLK and ATLK with perfect information strategies. More dedicated attempts produced so far only experimental algorithms, with preliminary performance results reported in [26, 8, 17, 9, 27] . Because of that, there are few benchmarks for model checking ATLir, and few experiments have actually been conducted.
The classes of models typically used to estimate the performance of ATLir model checking are TianJi [28, 8] and Castles [26] . The properties to be verified are usually reachability properties, saying that Tian Ji can achieve a win over the king (in TianJi), or that a given coalition of workers can defeat another castle (for Castles). We observe that both TianJi and Castles do not satisfy the necessary condition in Proposition 10. This is because the states of the model do not encode some relevant information about the actions that have been already played by the coalition. Thus, even one step before winning the game, the players take into account also some (possibly losing) states that couldn't be reached by the strategy that they are executing.
This means that the AEµC approximations, proposed in this paper, are not useful for TianJi and Castles. It also means that the benchmarks arguably do not capture realistic scenarios. We usually do not want to assume agents to forget their own actions from a few steps back. In the remainder, we propose several new benchmarks that can be used to evaluate our approximation scheme.
Finally, we note that most experiments reported in the literature use very simple input formulae (no nested strategic modalities; singleton coalitions or groups of agents with identical indistinguishability relations). As the results show, verification of such formulae is complex enough -see the performance of exact model checking in the rest of this section.
Verifying the Simple Voting Scenario
For the first benchmark, we adapt the simple voting scenario from Example 1. The model consists of k + 1 agents (k voters v1, . . . , v k , and 1 coercer c). The module of voter vi implements the transition structure from Figure 1 , with three modifications. First, the voter can at any state execute the "idle" action wait (this is needed to ensure uniformity of the resulting CEGS). In consequence, synchronous voting as well as interleaving of votes is allowed. Secondly, in states q3, . . . , q6, the coercer's action np ("no punishment") leads to an additional final state (q 7 , . . . , q 10 ), labeled accordingly. Thirdly, the old and new leaves in the structure (i.e., q7, . . . , q10, q 7 , . . . , q 10 ) are labeled with an additional atomic proposition finish i .
As specifications, we want to use the properties saying that: (i) the coercer can force the voter to vote for candidate 1 or else the voter is punished, and (ii) the voter can avoid voting for candidate 1 and being punished (cf. Example 2). Note, however, that the model used for the experiments is an unconstrained product of the voter modules. Thus, it includes also paths that were absent in the CEGS Mvote from Example 1 (in particular, ones where a voter executes wait all the time). To deal with this, we modify the specifications from Example 2 so that they discard such paths:
1. ϕ1 ≡ c ir G (finish i ∧ ¬pun i ) → vote i,1 which always holds in the voting scenario, 2. ϕ2 ≡ vi ir F finish i ∧ ¬pun i ∧ ¬vote i,1 which is always false.
The results of experiments for ϕ1 are shown in Figure 5 , and for ϕ2 in Figure 6 . The columns present the following information: parameter of the model (the number of voters k), size of the state space (#states), generation time for models (tgen), time and output of verification (tver, result) for model checking the lower approximation tr(ϕ), and similarly for the upper approximation TR(ϕ); the percentage of cases where the bounds have matched (match), and the total running time of the exact ATLir model checking for ϕ (tg+tv). The running times are given in seconds. Timeout indicates that the process did not terminate in 48 hours (!).
The computation of the lower and upper approximations was done with a straightforward implementation (in Python 3) of the fixpoint model checking algorithm for AEµC and ATLIr, respectively. We used the explicit representation of models, and the algorithms were not optimized in any way. The exact ATLir model checking was done with MCMAS 1.2.2 in such a way that the underlying CEGS of the ISPL code was isomorphic to the explicit models used to compute approximations. The subjective semantics of ATLir was obtained by using the option -atlk 2 and setting the initial states as the starting indistinguishability class for the proponent. All the tests were conducted on a PC with an Intel Core i5-2500 CPU with dynamic clock speed of 3.30 GHz up to 3,60 GHz, 8 GB of RAM (two modules DDR3, 1600 MHz bus clock), and Windows 10 (64bit). Discussion of results. Exact model checking with MC-MAS performed well on the inputs where no winning strategy existed (formula ϕ2), but was very bad at finding the existing winning strategy for formula ϕ1. In that case, our approximations offered huge speedup. Moreover, the approximations actually found the winning strategy in all the tested instances, thus producing fully conclusive output. This might be partly due to the fact that the scenario uses perfect recall models, i.e., ones encoding perfect memory of players explicitly in their local states. 
Bridge Endplay
We use bridge play scenarios of a type often considered in bridge handbooks and magazines. The task is to find a winning strategy for the declarer, usually depicted at the South position (S), in the k-endplay of the game, see Figure 7 for an example. The deck consists of 4n cards in total (n in each suit), 2 and the initial state captures each player holding k cards in their hand, after having played n − k cards. This way we obtain a family of models, parameterized by the possible values of (n, k). A NoTrump contract is being played; the declarer wins if she takes more than k/2 tricks in the endplay.
The players' cards are played sequentially (clockwise). S plays first at the beginning of the game. Each next trick (i.e., the set of four played cards, one per player) is opened by the player who won the latest trick. The declarer handles her own cards and the ones of the dummy (N). The opponents (W and E) handle their own hands each. The cards of the dummy are visible to everybody; the other hands are only seen by their owners. Each player remembers the cards that have already been played, including the ones that were used up before the initial state of the k-endplay. That is, the local state of a player contains: the current hand of the player, the current hand of the dummy, the cards from the deck that were already used up in the previous tricks, the status of the current trick, i.e., the sequence of pairs (player,card) for the cards already played within the trick (alternatively, the sequence of cards already played within the trick, plus who started the trick); and the current score (which team has won how many tricks so far).
We observe the following properties of the model. First, it is turn-based (with the "idle" action wait that players use when another player is laying down a card). Secondly, players have imperfect information, since they cannot infer (except for the last round) the hands of the other players. The missing information is relevant: anybody who has ever played bridge or poker knows how much the limited knowledge of the opponents' hands decreases one's chances of winning the game. Thirdly, this is a model of imperfect recall. The players do not remember in which order the cards have been played so far, and who had what cards;
3 formally: the model is a DAG and not a tree as there are histories h ≈a h such that last(h) ∼a last(h )). Finally, the model is lockstep (everybody sees when a transition happens), and thus tr2 and tr3 coincide on singleton coalitions. The results of the experiments for formula ϕ ≡ S ir Fwin are shown in Figure 8 . The columns present the following information: parameters of the model (n, k), size of the state space (#states), generation time for models (tgen), time and output of verification (tver, %true) for model checking the lower approximation tr(ϕ), and similarly for the upper approximation TR(ϕ); the percentage of cases where the bounds have matched (match), and the total running time of the exact ATLir model checking for ϕ (tg+tv). The times are given in seconds, except where indicated.
The experiments were run in the same environment as for the voting scenario in Section 6.2. Again, we ran the experiments for up to 48h per instance. The results in each row are averaged over 20 randomly generated instances, except for ( ) where only 1 instance was used. Discussion of results. In the experiments, our approximations offered a dramatic speedup. Exact model checking of ϕ was infeasible except for the simplest models (hundreds of states), even with an optimized symbolic model checker like MCMAS. In contrast, the bounds were verified for models up to millions of states. Moreover, our approximations obtained an astonishing level of accuracy: the bounds matched in 100% of the analyzed instances, thus producing fully conclusive output. This was partly because we only considered endplays in relatively small decks. The gap grows for decks of more than 20 cards (we verified that by hand on selected instances from bridge literature). Figure 10 : Absent-minded declarer, approximation tr2
Bridge Endplay by Absentminded Declarer
In the bridge endplay models, the players always see when a move is made. Thus, for singleton coalitions, the steadfast next-time operator a
• coincides with the standard nexttime abilities expressed by a . In order to better assess the performance, we have considered a variant of the scenario where the declarer is absentminded and does not see the cards being laid on the table until the end of each trick. Moreover, she can play her and the dummy's cards at any moment, even in parallel with the opponents. This results in larger indistinguishability classes for S, but also in a general increase of the number of states and transitions.
The results of the experiments are shown in Figure 9 . Note that, for this class of models, the bounds do not match as tightly as before. Still, the approximation was conclusive in an overwhelming majority of instances. Moreover, it grossly outperformed the exact model checking which was (barely) possible only in the trivial case of n = 1.
The models are not turn-based, not lockstep, and not of perfect recall. Since they are not lockstep, approximations tr2 and tr3 do not have to coincide. In Figure 10 , we present the experimental results obtained with tr2, which show that the improved approximation tr3 provides tighter lower bounds also from the practical point of view.
CONCLUSIONS
Verification of strategic properties in scenarios with imperfect information is difficult, both theoretically and in practice. In this paper, we suggest that model checking of logics like ATLir can be in some cases obtained by computing an under-and an overapproximation of the ATLir specification, and comparing if the bounds match. In a way, our proposal is similar to the idea of may/must abstraction [14, 4, 22] , only in our case the approximations are obtained by transforming formulae rather than models.
We propose such approximations, prove their correctness, and show that, for singleton coalitions, their values can be computed in polynomial time. We also propose novel benchmarks for experimental validation. Finally, we report very promising experimental results, in both performance and accuracy of the output. To our best knowledge, this is the first successful attempt at approximating strategic abilities under imperfect information by means of fixpoint methods.
